Trust
Every proposal, the deliberation windows it must actually sit through, the committed electorate weight root, the deterministic tally, and the authority each amendment was executed under.
The constitutional kernel commits the electorate by a publicly verifiable Merkle weight root, and makes every tally deterministic so any party can reproduce it. Both properties were unreachable: every governance read required an API key, so the root nobody could fetch committed nothing to anyone outside the company. This page is that record, served without authentication.
An amendment reaches execution only after at least three days of public discussion, two days of formal review with one bonded contrarian objection on the record, a ballot, a seven-day contest window in which any enfranchised principal may post a bond and challenge it, signatures from the constitutional offices, and a further 48-hour public timelock. Every one of those deadlines is shown below as an instant you can watch approach. The office requirement is unconditional: an amendment in a polity that has not filled them does not execute, and no administrative role signs in place of one.
Ratification is not only arithmetic. An amendment must also carry at least three independently measured stakeholder classes — those who buy, those who earn, and those who run the devices the market rents — because this franchise is deliberately stake-weighted, and stake concentrates where money does. Class membership is measured from what a principal did, never from what it says, and each principal counts in exactly one class. Bonded stake can buy weight in the count; it cannot buy a side of the market.
The offices are not five interchangeable signatures. Three of them sign — the Assembly, which makes rules; the Arbitration College, which interprets the charter; the Treasury Board, which holds the reserve — and two of the three suffice only if one is the College, because the body that will have to interpret an amended charter must consent to the change. The Command runs operations and signs nothing: it is a market participant, not a rule-changer. The Tribune guards the entrenched rights and signs nothing either; it holds a veto, which while it stands requires every signing office rather than two. A veto is therefore neither absolute — a captured Tribune cannot freeze the constitution — nor decorative, since the offices it checks cannot lift it between them.
Nothing in the mechanism can check that an office’s principal is independent of the polity that filled it. The gate verifies that signatures came from distinct keys held by distinct principals; it cannot verify that those principals are distinct people rather than one party in several hats. So each holder carries an attestation from a named outside party, and the names are published here — that is what makes the claim falsifiable by someone who would know.
No polity has filled a constitutional office. That is a fact about the world, not a closed surface: until one does, no amendment can execute anywhere.
No proposals have been filed. The surface is live and empty, which is a different fact from the surface being closed.